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INTRODUCTION 
Pay-what-you-want (PWYW) is a unique participative pricing mechanism in which the buyers 
can pay nothing or pay any price they want and the seller has to accept it without being able to 
withdraw the offer (Kim et al., 2009, 2014). Prior research on PWYW pricing, focuses on the 
direct and interactive effects of several individual and situational variables, such as altruism, 
price consciousness and fairness perceptions (Kim et al., 2009), involvement level (Roy 2015), 
internal reference prices (Roy et al. 2016a), external reference prices, social visibility and 
purchase motivation (Roy et al. 2016b). However, most of these studies were conducted in 
popular service contexts such as restaurant, cinema and delicatessen (Kim et al., 2009, 2014; 
Roy et al. 2016a,b). Hence, it is not clear if and to what extent the mechanism by which 
consumers decide how much to pay in a PWYW setting, is similar or different between the 
products and services contexts. Similarly, recent studies examine the role of product involvement 
and social visibility in PWYW decision-making process but ignore other variables such as 
consumer knowledge and product/service characteristics. We address both these gaps with a new 
conceptual model that incorporates direct and interactive effects of consumer knowledge, social 
visibility and tangibility as the independent variables and the allocation of internal reference 
prices into the prices that the consumers are willing to pay as the dependent variable, while 
controlling for involvement level. We use a lab experiment with undergraduate students to test 
our hypotheses and report our findings in this paper.  
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
PWYW is an innovative strategy that shifts the control over pricing decisions from the seller to 
the buyer (Santana and Morwitz, 2011). Consumers perceive greater control and purchase 
intentions (Kim et al., 2009) as well as fairness and satisfaction (Haws and Bearden 2006) in 
PWYW settings because of their active participation in the price-setting process. PWYW also 
allows consumers to evaluate their consumption experiences individually and this leads to price 
differentiation and heterogeneous evaluations (Spann and Tellis, 2006). Finally, PWYW may la 
benefit the sellers by helping them attract more buyers (especially those who may be more price- 
conscious) who may not otherwise think about buying from them (Kim et al., 2009). 
Buyers in PWYW setting often rely on memory-based cues, such as internal reference price 
(Kim et al., 2009). For example, Kim et al. (2009) show that buyers are willing to discharge a 
certain proportion of their internal reference price (IRP) to the seller in a PWYW setting, across 
a diverse range of product categories, including restaurants, cinema, and hot beverages. The 
proportions of internal reference price discharged to the seller were influenced by variables such 
as fairness, altruism, price consciousness, income, satisfaction, and reference price. 
More recently, Roy et al. (2016a) extend this line of research to show that altruism and social 
desirability have positive effects on IRP and price consciousness affects IRP negatively. IRP also 
mediates the effects of altruism, social desirability and price consciousness on WTP (price 
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consumers are willing to pay in PWYW setting), future purchase intention and attitude towards 
the seller. Roy (2015) further investigates the relationship between IRP and WTP to show that 
product involvement and price-consciousness negatively moderate this relationship. Similarly, 
Roy et al. (2016b) show that consumers allocate a higher share (RATIO) of their internal 
reference prices (IRPs) to the prices to be paid (PTP) in PWYW context, in private under 
intrinsic purchase motivation and in public under extrinsic or altruistic motivation and this effect 
is more pronounced in the absence of ERP.  
Notwithstanding the useful contribution of all these studies, it is still not clear why consumers 
with higher involvement level would be willing to pay less under PWYW setting and if there are 
any other factors besides purchase motivation and involvement that may influence consumers’ 
PWYW pricing decisions. Moreover, most of these studies focus on services and hence it is not 
clear if the underlying mechanism for consumers’ pricing decisions would be similar or different 
for products versus services. To address these gaps we explore the interactive effects of social 
visibility with two new variables (consumer knowledge and tangibility) on RATIO (proportion 
of internal references prices that consumers are willing to allocate to the prices to be paid in 
PWYW context). Specifically, in this paper we put forth and test the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Consumer knowledge has a negative effect on RATIO, such that consumers with higher 
(lower) knowledge about a product/service pay lower (higher) prices. 
H2:  Social visibility has a positive effect on RATIO, such that consumers pay lower (higher) 
prices under lower (higher) social visibility. 
H3: Tangibility has a positive effect on RATIO, such that consumers pay lower (higher) 
prices for a product/service with higher (lower) tangibility. 
H4: Social visibility negatively moderates the effect of consumer knowledge on RATIO, such 
that the negative effect of consumer knowledge is weaker (stronger) under higher (lower) 
social visibility. 
H5: Tangibility negatively moderates the effect of consumer knowledge on RATIO, such that 
the negative effect of consumer knowledge is weaker (stronger) under higher (lower) 
tangibility. 
H6: Tangibility positively moderates the effect of social visibility on RATIO, such that the 
positive effect of social visibility is stronger (weaker) under higher (lower) tangibility. 
H7: Tangibility negatively moderates the two-way interaction between consumer knowledge 
and social visibility, such that the negative effect of consumer knowledge is weaker 
(stronger) with higher (lower) social visibility for product/ service with low tangibility; 
and vice versa for those with high tangibility. 
METHODOLOGY 
We used a 2 X 2 X 2 lab experiment using imaginary scenarios at a large Australian University 
with 200 participants (102 females) with movies as the research setting. We chose university 
students for this study, as they are a primary target segment for movies. 65% of the respondents 
are aged 25 years or below and 72% watch movies regularly (at least once a week). Most 
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respondents (90%) have monthly expenditure of AU$2000 or less. Participation in this study was 
voluntary and the participants did not receive any credit or compensation. We manipulated 
consumer knowledge (low vs. high), social visibility (alone vs. with friends) and tangibility 
(watching movie in cinema vs. watching movie DVD at home) using eight versions of a basic 
scenario, as follows: “You are at the movie theatre (DVD rental store) alone (with your friends) 
on a weekend and thinking about which movie to watch. You see a poster for a new movie about 
which you have read many (not read any) reviews and are quite (not at all) familiar with its 
storyline, the main characters and the cast. As you think about (discuss with your friends) about 
this movie, you notice a special offer which allows you can pay whatever price you want for a 
movie ticket (including a price of zero)”. After reading this scenario, the participants recorded 
the amount of money they would be willing to pay (WTP) followed by well-established scales 
for study realism, price consciousness, internal reference price, social desirability, future 
intention. Finally, we recorded their gender, age, monthly expenses and movie watching habits. 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We tested all the scale items for their reliability, and validity using confirmatory factor analysis 
with AMOS 22.0.  Measurement model shows a good fit (2 = 232.26, df = 168, 2/df = 1.41, 
RMSEA = .045, CFI = .95, NFI = .90, SRMR = .051) with all the fit-indices are better than the 
recommended cut-off values (RMSEA < .06, SRMR < .08, CFI > .95, NFI > .90). All factor 
loadings are large and load significantly (at .01 level) on their expected latent constructs, 
showing convergent validity.  All the scales are reliable with high composite reliabilities (.76 – 
.93) and show discriminant validity with the average variance extracted (AVE) for each construct 
higher than the square of its correlations with all the other constructs. 
Next, we used Univariate Analysis of Variance (UNIANOVA) with SPSS 22.0 to test all the 
hypotheses, with the three manipulated variables as fixed factors, all demographics as covariates 
and RATIO as the dependent variable. Consumer knowledge has a significant effect on RATIO 
with a higher (53% vs. 48%) allocation of IRP into WTP under low (vs. high) knowledge (H1); 
whereas the effects of social visibility (H2) and tangibility (H3) are in expected direction but not 
significant. The two-way interactions among visibility and knowledge (H4), tangibility and 
knowledge (H5) and tangibility and visibility (H6) are also not significant; however, the three-
way interaction among these variables (H7) is significant (F = 10.16, p < .01). 
DISCUSSION 
We found mix support for our hypotheses with most of the effects in the expected direction but 
some are not significant (possibly due to our relatively small sample size). One of our key 
findings is that consumers with lower knowledge about a movie are willing to allocate a higher 
proportion of their IRP for higher tangibility product (DVD) in private and lower tangibility 
(Cinema) in public. In contrast, consumers with higher knowledge are willing to allocate greater 
proportion of their IRP for the Movie in private and DVD in public. We argue that low consumer 
knowledge could be like a default or baseline condition where consumers behave simply based 
on the congruence of tangibility and context, paying more for a DVD (high tangibility) in private 
and Movie (low tangibility) in public. In contrast, for high product knowledge, watching movie 
in theatre may be more satisfactory when alone because of the bigger screen and better viewing 
experience whereas watching a DVD will be more satisfactory when with friends because it may 
allow them to show off their knowledge. 
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